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ABSTRACT 
 
There is general acceptance that those who break the law must be punished; however, not all 
agree as to why this is necessary. Some argue punishment is necessary to reform criminals, 
others to deter criminals, and others because you deserve it, whether punishment reforms or 
deters. Stripped of metaphors, this paper argues that punishment is retribution, but that a 
distinction must be made between the definition of punishment as retribution and its 
justification, if a case is to be made for its moral justification. Thus the most important 
question the paper raises relates to the justification of punishment as retribution. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
I 
Introduction  
 
The law takes the form of imperatives, of commands and orders, of ‗do‘s‘ and ‗don‘ts‘. It is 
possible, however, to disobey the law. Freedom is thus left to individuals either to obey or 
not to obey the law, to do what is legally required or not to do what is legally required. The 
law, therefore, seeks compliance in free choice. The law itself, then, does not bring along 
enforcement and it does not have any automatic in-built enforcement system of its own that 
it can use either to coerce or to encourage people to obey the law.2 What, then, happens 
when people do not obey the law, break the law?  What about crime? In response to this 
matter, it is generally taken for granted that those who break the law ought to be punished.3  
                                                 
1 This is a slightly revised and expanded version of a lecture I gave to the Philosophy Society at NUI Maynooth 
on ‗The State‘s Justification of Punishment‘, on Thursday 20th November, 2008. I wish to thank the President 
of the Philosophy Society, Joseph Feely, for the invitation to talk to the Maynooth students‘ Philosophy Society 
and the students present at the lecture for their lively engagement and questioning of the issues, both during 
and after the lecture. I also wish to dedicate this article to the memory of my former teacher and Professor of 
Philosophy, Professor Matthew O‘Donnell, who delivered an insightful public lecture on ‗The Morality of 
Punishment‘ to the Maynooth students‘ Philosophy Society in 1986, if my memory serves me well. Any errors 
in my analysis are, of course, entirely my own. I would also like to thank Oliver O‘Donovan for his critical 
remarks of an earlier draft of this paper, and which made me clarify further some points made in this final 
version. 
2 Thus J. D. Mabbott‘s point: ‗Punishment is a corollary not of law but of law-breaking‘, ‗Punishment‘, Mind 48 
(1939), 152–167 (p. 161). 
3 Of course, governments do and could take alternative measures to encourage law-abiding, e.g., they offer 
inducements, such as tax amnesties, to those who have already broken the law in order to encourage those law-
breakers to conform to existing law without impunity, or governments engage in psychological advertisement 
campaigns (e.g. ―speeding kills‖ with vivid images of those seriously hurt or killed) in order to make people 
aware of the importance of keeping speed-limits and obeying laws etc. The morality or effectiveness of these 
measures, however, is not the concern of this article because if you are caught driving over the speed limit, or if 
you are found not to be paying the requisite amount of tax, after the tax amnesty is over, you are to be 
punished. The law, then, in the end, needs ‗teeth‘, so it is believed, in order to ensure conformity, and so, 
resorts to the threat and actual infliction of punishment, of pain or deprivation of freedom. This is 
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 There is, then, general acceptance that those who break the law must be punished. 
People, however, are not in agreement as to why punishment is necessary. Some argue that 
punishment is necessary in order to reform the law-breaker. Others argue that punishment is 
necessary in order to deter potential law-breaking. Others again argue that whether the 
person who commits a crime is reformed through the infliction of punishment, or not, and 
whether potential law-breakers are deterred from committing crime through knowing about 
the punishment of offenders, or not, you deserve to be punished for the crime that you 
committed.4 ‗One fact and one fact only can justify the punishment of this man, and that is a 
past fact, that he has committed a crime.‘5 This, as Mabbot argues, is what punishment 
means: punishment is retribution. 6  There is no other way in which punishment can be 
understood. For the retributivist, then, concerns that related to reform and deterrence are 
entirely extraneous matters to the point and purpose of punishment, and so, irrelevant to the 
question of its moral justification. As Mabbott again succinctly puts it: 
 
The truth is that while punishing a man and punishing him justly, it is possible to deter 
others, and also to attempt to reform him, and if these additional goods are achieved the 
total state of affairs is better than it would be with the just punishment alone. But reform 
and deterrence are not modifications of the punishment, still less reasons for it. […] But the 
punishment [qua retribution] would be no less just were reporters excluded and deterrence 
not achieved. […] (P)unishment itself seldom reforms the criminal and never deters others. It 
is only ―extra‖ [outside of punishment] arrangements which have any chance of achieving 
either result.7 
                                                                                                                                                 
the topic of this paper, namely, the necessity of punishment as such. The moral evaluation of the content of the 
law, therefore, is not the focus of this paper. Thus the issue of obeying or not obeying a law as a matter of 
conscientious objection, for instance, the boxer Mohammed Ali‘s well-known refusal to abide by Military 
Conscription Laws during the Vietnam War, or kindred moral issues, such as, capital punishment and the right 
to life, or moral reasons adduced for refusing to pay one‘s taxes to a government that uses a considerable 
amount of those taxes to produce more nuclear weapons, etc., or the morality of a school or a parent inflicting 
corporal punishment on a student or a child is not the concern of this article. 
4 Immanuel Kant is probably one of the most well-known defenders of such a ‗just deserts theory‘, as it is often 
called, or ‗retributive‘ justification of punishment, but it has had its supporters both before and after Kant. In 
his famous 1788 Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that punishment is ‗good in itself, even if nothing 
further results from it‘. I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1949), p. 170. James Rachels takes up and supports Kant‘s thesis (curiously on the back of 
‗utilitarian‘ arguments) in his ‗Punishment and Desert‘, in Ethics and Practice, ed. by Hugh LaFollette (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1997), pp. 470–479. 
5 Mabbott, p. 152. 
6 Oliver O‘Donovan notes that ‗(T)he name ―punishment‖ means ―requital‖ or ―return,‖ deriving from an 
Indo-European root meaning ―exchange,‖ and is therefore not very remote semantically form the term 
―retribution,‖ which means ―giving back.‖ O. O‘Donovan, The Ways of Judgment (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2005), 
Chapter 7 ‗Punishment‘, p. 101. What exactly is being given back, however, is highly problematical, but one 
thing is certain that it has to be a harm that is given (back?) to the offender of the crime. Therefore, ‗(T)he 
practice [of punishment]‘, as O‘Donovan continues, ‗consists in responding to a wrong which somebody had 
done by inflicting an evil upon the wrong-doer. It is described formally by Hugo Grotius as ―suffering harm 
having done harm.‖‘ (ibid.). Far from making sense of, or justifying this practice, ‗(T)hese words‘, nevertheless, 
as O‘Donovan correctly concludes, ‗name the practice, they do not theorize about it. The task of a theory of 
punishment [on the other hand] is to make this practice of requiting and returning intelligible‘ (ibid.). 
7  Mabbott, pp. 152–4. This is why Oliver O‘Donovan remarks that ‗(T)he reason for this, of course, is not simply 
definitional or philological, but has to do with the nature of the practice of punishment and its conditions of rationality‘. (p. 
193). This leads O‘Donovan , in agreement with Mabbot, to conclude that ‗(T)heories of punishment cannot therefore be 
divided into those which see it as backward-looking and those which see it as forward-looking. The latter 
category [of ‗utilitarian‘ theory] would not be theories of punishment at all‘ (ibid.). In the analysis of the 
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 So, must punishment have all or only some of the four elements in it mentioned 
above in order for it to be morally justified? Must punishment take place (1) after a crime has 
been committed, (2) act as a preventative measure for the future law breaking/ crime 
through deterring potential criminals who have not yet broken the law, (3) reform criminals 
who have already broken the law, as well as (4) exact retribution for breaking the law? If, on 
the other hand, it can be demonstrated that punishment is either not entirely or totally 
ineffective in achieving what it claims to do in relation to the crime committed, that is to say, 
in exacting retribution, or in reforming the offender, or in preventing and deterring crime, is 
it still justifiable? Besides these theoretical questions pertaining to the purpose, value, 
effectiveness and justifications of punishment, there are practical questions which the topic 
of punishment also raises and that often evoke strong moral debate, such as, for instance, 
the severity of the punishment in relation to the crime committed, or the kinds of 
punishments that are acceptable in a given society, e.g., floggings, amputations, methods of 
capital punishments, (humane/ inhumane) conditions of imprisonment, fines for a person of 
plenty means versus for a person of few means. These latter concerns relate to the practices 
of punishment, but they presuppose that punishment, in whatever format it takes, is 
justified. In this paper, I will not be concerned with these matters pertaining to the practices 
of punishment, but with the more fundamental and theoretical issue regarding the 
justification of punishment itself (no matter what practical format the latter may take).8 Of 
course, not only the State punishes, so do parents, schools, employers, football managers 
and so forth. And there are complex and interlocking issues here too, such as, for instance, 
whether a school or only a parent has the right to punish a child for that child‘s 
misbehaviour, or whether the State can legitimately intervene in a parent‘s particular 
chastisement of a child, in private or in public, and so forth. All of these presuppose, 
nevertheless, that punishment as a practice by either a public or private authority is 
justifiable. For the purposes of this article, however, I will not be concerned with practices 
of punishment outside of the State, and will confine my attention only to those general 
features of punishment and its justification that are most relevant to an evaluation of the 
State‘s justification of punishment.  
 Before addressing the issue of the State‘s justification of punishment, however, one 
could argue that there is no moral or practical necessity imposed on the State to justify its 
infliction of punishment on those who infringe State law. ‗In a normal exercise of judgement 
within civil society,‘ as one commentator notes, ‗we have no need to ask whether any given 
act of punishment will serve the social good or not; it serves it by being a just and consistent 
                                                                                                                                                 
justification of punishment, nevertheless, O‘Donovan believes that we must not fall back into, as someone like 
Mabbott does, ‗the usual confusion of retribution as a [punitive] practice with retributivism as a [moral 
justificatory] theory of punishment‘ (p. 105). Whether O‘Donovan‘s own proposal to relinquish both 
retributive back-ward looking theories of punishment and utilitarian forward-looking theories  of punishment in 
favor of examining what punishment practices actually does in concreto, i.e., in a particular society or social 
existence (e.g. a family, a school, a work-place, a community etc.,) in terms of  a ‗judgment‘ that is offered by 
that society both to itself and to the offender to legitimate the society‘s ‗truth about itself‘ (p. 118) still leaves 
the moral justification of those practices of punishment at least debatable. See, infra, n. 8 and n. 10 
8 O‘Donovan seeks to situate particular practices of punishment in terms of  a ‗(J)udgment [that] offers society 
the truth about itself, just as it offers the offender the truth about himself. [In this regard] Each needs to grasp 
its own truth in order to flourish in relation to the other.‘ (p. 118). This is true. Punishment tends to re-enforce 
the values of a given society at a given time, rather than call into question the values of that society. Whether 
this can be construed as a moral justification for the necessity of such punishment or ‗judgment‘ of society, 
however, is another matter. See, infra, n. 10 
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application of a practice on which society depends.‘ 9  From this point of view, then, 
punishment of criminals is regarded by most to be part and partial of the way society has 
always operated.10 It is thus an essential part of the very ‗fabric of society‘ and of the way 
society actually works and runs. Without punishment, society, as we know it, would 
disintegrate and disappear, and possibly bring into actual existence that famous Hobbesian-
hypothetical ‗original state of Nature‘ wherein human life is imagined to be ‗solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short‘.11 If punishment is a necessary feature for maintaining law and order 
and for holding society together, as some contend, then perhaps we could be excused from 
this entire debate and simply maintain that there is neither case nor cause to be made by 
anyone for moral inquiry into the State‘s justification of punishment. In other words, the 
justification of punishment (both in practice and in theory) by the State is, as a matter of 
fact, self-evident. And yet, such a moral short-cut does not obviate the fact that punishment 
is damage to people. People are being taken against their will and some form of suffering/ 
pain is inflicted upon them. Fear and suffering are things that one should try to eliminate 
from human life. The deliberate infliction of pain or suffering on those who break the law and 
commit crime, therefore, is not self-justifying; rather, it requires justification, as Honderich 
points out.12 And so, if whatever we have responsibility for is a matter of morality, then it 
follows that the question ‗what right has the state to inflict punishment on those who 
infringe the law?‘ can be legitimately posed. Note here that what is to be addressed in this 
question is not the issue of the fairness (or otherwise) of infliction of punishment on 
innocent people and the (alleged) benefits or otherwise of doing so by the State — one calls 
such acts ‗miscarriages of justices‘, when later discovered — but the question: why punish the 
guilty?13  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 O‘Donovan, p. 118. 
10 ‗There is no point in discussing punishment as though it were an optional extra, something which human 
societies may choose to do or not to do — in general terms, that is, for they are always in a position either to 
punish or not to punish in a particular case. All theories must accept that human communities do punish and 
always have punished, for that is what they are required explain.‘ O‘Donovan, p. 103. Punishment, as matter of 
fact, nevertheless, does not make it a matter of right, and it is the latter that a moral theory of punishment is 
supposed to provide the justification. It seems to me that retributivist theories, in whatever guise they take, 
cannot do this. Nor do utilitarian-consequentialist theories fare better. Viewing punishment as a society‘s 
judgment does help us to understand better what punishment is doing, as O‘Donovan argues, but that does not 
make the practice(s) of punishment (any more) acceptable, from a moral point of view. That human 
communities do punish is not an adequate answer to the moral question should human communities punish, and 
it is the latter moral question that this paper seeks to address. This, of course, would mean that neither public 
(e.g., the State) nor private (e.g., a parent) authorities are morally justified in their punitive practices just because 
it is they who engage in such practices.  
11 See, Rachels, pp. 475–476. 
12 See, Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications (Hutchinson & Harcourt Brace, 1969), esp., Chapter 
One Problem, ‗Section 1 The Need for Justification‘, p.11. As Honderich also remarks: ‗The general claim, that 
one cannot but regard punishment as in need of justification, is itself a judgment of a moral nature‘ (p. 12). 
13 It is often argued against the utilitarian justification of punishment that the latter could proffer good reasons 
for punishing an innocent person. This attack, of course, avoids the real issue of the debate, and that is the 
morality of punishing the guilty. This attack, however, is usually deployed by supporters of the retributive theory 
of punishment who assume ‗punishing the guilty‘ to be a self-evident moral truth. This latter assumption is the 
issue that mostly concerns us here. 
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II 
Punishment as Spoken of in Metaphors 
The human being is the only animal that punishes some of its own members. Punishment, 
therefore, is quite a human institution, but in this very fact the institution of punishment, like 
any of our other social institutions, is amenable to moral evaluation. A complicating factor in 
both understanding and assessing the State‘s justification of punishment, however, is that 
punishment is often talked about in metaphors, such as, for instance: (1) ‗balancing the scales 
of justice‘; (2) ‗wiping the slate clean‘; (3) ‗paying a due (or a debt) back to society‘; (4) 
‗removing a cancer from society‘, and so forth. Such metaphors, alas, are, at best, darkening 
metaphors that cast much obscurity on the topic of the debate from the outset. They do not 
help matters. As such, they need to be dealt with briefly and dispelled, before any intelligible 
discussion of punishment and its justification can unfold.14 
 
(1) Balancing the Scales of Justice 
 
In inflicting punishment on the perpetrator of a crime, what, exactly, is being balanced by 
the punishment? Firstly, the crime committed and the punishment inflicted by the State are 
clearly not similar units of comparison. They thus cannot be balanced. Secondly, if 
‗balancing the scales of justice‘ means ‗restoring law and order‘ or ‗restoring the unfair 
advantage gained through crime‘ (as it is often put) through punishment this is clearly not 
the case. The infliction of punishment on the offender for the crime perpetrated cannot a 
priori restore the status of ‗law and order‘ before the crime took place, nor act as a support 
(‗back-up‘) to ‗law and order‘, or prevent law-breaking precisely because you are punished 
because you broke the law. Punishment steps in after the crime has been committed. Nothing 
is ‗restored‘ or ‗balanced‘ through the punishment. If one still wishes to look at punishment 
in terms of balancing the scales of justice, it can only mean revenge; that is to say, you 
deserve to be harmed because your actions harmed society, and that ‗balances‘ things. 15 
Whether punishment, as a formal institutional revenge-system of the State, is morally 
justifiable, or not, is an issue that would require much more in-depth analysis than I can 
presently give in this paper.16 It is, nevertheless, of relevance to note about any alleged link 
between the infliction of punishment on an offender and the offender‘s crime that nothing 
whatsoever, in reality, is being ‗weighed‘, ‗balanced‘, ‗rectified‘ or ‗restored‘ through the 
punishment (as the metaphor would suggest).17 Any alleged real connection between the 
                                                 
14 In relation to the metaphorical depiction of ‗punishment‘ as a natural reflex action of society, ‘like that of a 
living body to injury‘, Honderich remarks, this is ‗at best darkening metaphor‘ (p. 11). This evaluation can be 
extended to most (if not all) of the metaphors deployed in the depiction of punishment as ‗balancing the scales 
of justice‘, ‗wiping the slate clean‘, ‗paying a debt back to society‘, ‗removing a cancer from society‘ and so 
forth. 
15 This is the main point of Rachel‘s paper regarding the justification of the retributive theory of punishment, 
which in that author‘s view, falls under ‗the general idea of desert‘.  
16 Even if one argues that the State, through its punitive systems, is an impartial and disinterested party, and so, 
not personally revengeful, this, of course, does not prohibit or preclude a person bringing a court action against 
another individual(s) from a motive of personal revenge. 
17 Rachels, for instance, believes that ‗Punishment corrects things in the direction of greater equality. That is 
why it is commonly said that crime ―upsets the scales of justice‖ and that punishing wrongdoers ―restores the 
balance‖.‘ (p. 475, ff.) That crime causes hurt, harm, damage, sometimes death, and unfair advantage over 
others is undeniable, but punishment does not make amends for such hurt, harm, damage, death, or unfair 
advantage gained. Punishment does not and cannot restore the initial ‗wrong-doing‘. Other non-punitive 
measures that seek to ‗restore‘, ‗recompense‘, ‗rehabilitate‘, ‗restrain‘, would appear to be more appropriate 
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inflictions of punishment and the crimes committed is mythical because in such cases one is 
comparing the incomparable. 18  ‗No punishment, [then,] however fitting, can restore the 
world to an equivalent condition to that obtaining before the crime.‘19  This is because, as 
O‘Donovan also notes, ‗There is no ―equality‖ between how things were before the offense 
and how they are after the punishment.‘20 
 
(2) ‘Wiping the Slate Clean’ 
 
What exactly is being ‗wiped clean‘ through the punishment? The crime committed is a 
historical event. What is done cannot be undone. Punishment cannot wipe out the historicity 
of the crime. What is wiped clean through punishment in the eyes of the State, of course, is 
one‘s liability to be punished again for the same crime (‗I did my time‘). This does not do 
anything for the crime, however. In this sense, nevertheless, it is no doubt true to say that 
punishment does something, it removes legal guilt; but the crime committed is not being 
‗annulled‘ by the punishment.21 Furthermore, legal guilt and moral guilt are two different 
things. Legal guilt can be removed upon completion of the punishment (e.g., the sentence), 
but this does not mean that moral guilt (if one was sorry for the crime committed, for 
example,) will be removed on completion of the punishment. Punishment is not the kind of 
thing that removes moral guilt. Forgiveness does this; but forgiveness is not permissible in a 
court of law. If the person in the ‗dock‘ is found guilty of committing a crime, and is sorry, 
the person still must be punished. It is not the State‘s (or the judge‘s) function in a court of 
law either to choose or not to choose to inflict punishment on the offender; nor is it the 
offender‘s choice either to receive or not to receive the punishment meted out by the state. 
Punishment is inflicted against the will of the individual. 22  Punishment involves no 
negotiation; it is domination.23 In sum, nothing is being wiped clean by the punishment, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
responses to the wrong-doing involved. O‘Donovan, for example, notes that ‗If you take what the thief stole 
and return it to its rightful owner, that is not punishment, merely restitution; if you take the life of the 
murderer who took your brother‘s life, that is not punishment, but vengeance (p. 111). Given that O‘Donovan 
seeks to defend the practice of punishment in terms of society‘s ‗judgment‘, such remedies as restitution are 
therefore ‗merely‘ restitution, and personal acts of vengeance not ‗punishment‘ because personal. See our 
conclusion. 
18 Even if we take it to be literally the case that punishment ‗must fit‘ the crime — as in ‗an eye for an eye‘ etc. 
— the pain inflicted by the criminal and the pain inflicted by the state are not identical units. If a person, for 
example, murders (= unjustly kills) another person, and forfeits one‘s life through capital punishment, the State 
does not believe that it is murdering (= unjustly killing) its citizens. This is borne out in Rachels own remarks, 
towards the end of his paper in a section entitled ‗Proportionality: The punishment should be proportional to the 
crime‘, when he declares (self-defeatingly in my view): ‗Sometimes it is not easy to say what punishment ―fits‖ 
crime; nevertheless, the basic idea is clear enough‘. O‘Donovan also notes that ‗(I)n fact, the only practical 
application of the lex talionis ever advocated is the death penalty for murder‘ (p. 120), but even in this case our 
comment above holds — the state does not believe it is doing the same thing as the murder, murdering 
(unjustly killing) a fellow citizen. 
19 O‘Donovan, p. 112.  
20 O‘Donovan, pp. 111-112. Thus no ‗status quo ante‘ is being ‗restored‘ or ‗given back‘ or ‗annulled‘ through 
such punishment, as Hegel and others suggest (ibid.). See also supra, n. 17. 
21 See previous n. 20 and n. 17. 
22 This is what Lucas refers to when he says punishments are ‗unwelcomed‘. See J.R. Lucas, Responsibility 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Chapter 6 Punishment, pp. 86–123 (p. 86). 
23 In ‗Section 2. Why People Should Be Treated as They Deserve‘, Rachels argues that ‗those who treat others 
badly provoke ill treatment in return. That is why, when a criminal is punished, it may be said that ―He brought 
it on himself‖.‘ This, however, is a largely metaphorical expression. The convicted criminal does not choose the 
punishment for the crime he committed and the law broken; rather, punishment is inflicted against the will of 
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the metaphor would suggest, neither the crime committed nor the moral guilt that the 
offender may have regarding the crime committed. 
  
(3) ‘Paying a Due (or a Debt) Back to Society’ 
 
What ‗due‘ (or ‗debt‘) exactly is being paid back (or owed) to society by way of the infliction 
of the actual punishment on the offender (whatever format the punishment takes, e.g., 
incarceration, fines, floggings, amputations, capital punishment)?  When it is said that 
punishment is for the crime, this does not mean that it is in support of the crime (as when 
one says ‗John is for Manchester United‘), nor does it mean that punishment cancels the 
crime (as in when one says an aspirin is for a headache, i.e., it cancels the headache); rather, it 
identifies whom it is that is to be punished — punishment is for the person who perpetrated 
the crime, and not for the person who did not commit the crime. Only the guilty are to be 
punished. But this identifies the person who did the crime and does nothing for the crime 
perpetrated.24 Punishment for the crime might mean that this amount of punishment is to be 
meted out against that person for the crime that that person has been found guilty of. Again, 
it is the commensurability of the severity of punishment to be allotted that is being captured 
here, and nothing about the crime itself — the severity of the punishment does not remove 
or cancel or fix the crime done.25 What actual ‗due‘ (or ‗debt‘) then, is being paid back to 
society (or ‗being collected by society‘) through the punishment? 26 
 
(4) ‘Removing a Cancer from Society’ 
 
If punishment cannot do anything about the crime that actually has been committed, but is, 
nevertheless, to be allotted to the person who is guilty of committing the crime, then is this 
what is captured by the metaphor of punishment as necessary in order to remove such ‗a 
cancer from society‘? This way of talking about punishment, however, is entirely misleading. 
Surgery does something with cancerous cells, and if successful the individual is able to live. 
Surgery improves things. Punishment, on the other hand, does nothing about the crime 
committed. Punishment does not improve things that were originally wrong or requiring 
fixing. What, then, exactly is being done to ‗fix‘ the crime through the deliberate infliction of 
pain/ suffering on a person who committed the crime? If punishment as ‗removing a cancer 
from society‘ refers to detaining the person who committed the crime in prison, what is 
                                                                                                                                                 
the (caught and prosecuted and found guilty) individual. See infra n. 30 and corresponding definition of 
punishment given by Hart.  
24 ‗Punishment singles the offender out for especially disfavorable treatment, and is thus coercive in a way other 
forms of judgment are not. Punishment excludes the offender from some elementary form of respect for 
person, property, and liberty that citizens customarily accord to one another.‘ (O‘Donovan, pp. 109–10, my 
emphasis). 
25 And, of course, this asserted commensurability or ‗fittingness‘ or ‗proportionality‘ between the crime and the 
punishment is mythological because, in reality, ‗(T)he relation between them cannot be an exchange, which only 
occurs between commensurables‘ (O‘Donovan, p. 110). 
26 Stripped of metaphor, then, ‗in reality what is at stake in this question is the relation of retributive practice to 
the goods it secures‘ (O‘Donovan, p. 115). In reality, however, punishment does not benefit ‗the victim‘, nor 
‗the offender‘, nor ‗society at large‘, which are the ‗three possible beneficiaries of punishment‘ or ‗goods‘ that 
traditional-classical discussion on punishment, as O‘Donovan comments, identified (pp. 115–16). The question 
what is punishment good for is an intelligible question, and so, requires an answer of some sort. If the answer 
to this question is that punishment, as a practice, is not good for what it claims to rectify or to resolve in 
relation to the crime, then that is of utmost significance to its evaluation.  
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removed is the person who committed the crime, and not the crime, the crime remains in 
place. And if this person is removed from life altogether, through State inflicted capital 
punishment, such still does not remove the crime.27 
 If it is the case that punishment cannot, as a matter of fact, do anything afterwards to 
remedy the initial crime that has taken place precisely because the crime has taken place, 
what about the victim of the crime? Has not the victim the right to have grievance satisfied? 
Is the satisfaction of grievance not a justification of punishment?  
 That punishment of the offender satisfies grievance in some cases cannot be 
doubted, but in many cases punishment of the offender does not (and cannot) alleviate 
grievance or irreparable harm endured by those upon whom the crime was perpetrated or 
upon whom it had a detrimental affect.28 Even if Kant is right to note that ‗when someone 
who delights in annoying and vexing peace-loving folk receives at last a right good beating, it 
certainly is an ill, but everyone approves of it and considers it good in itself, even if nothing 
further results from it‘,29 we can still raise the question is delight in seeing someone suffer, 
even a scoundrel, and the satisfaction of grievance experienced therein, a legitimate moral 
basis for the justification of inflicting punishment on the perpetrator? That is the moral 
question that needs to be addressed, and any answer to this question has to be argued for 
and reasons supplied, and not just asserted. Statements of fact do not make statements of 
right. Feelings do not win arguments. Nor do feelings loose arguments. Feelings, simply, 
cannot be substituted for argument.30 Again, it is outside the limits of this article to address 
this complex issue, but it is of relevance to note in relation to the case put forward for the 
necessity of punishment to alleviate grievance that many victims of crime, or those close to a 
victim of crime, hold the view that punishment of the offender(s) does not and cannot 
alleviate grief suffered or damage done simply because punishing the perpetrator(s) cannot 
undo the crime done and the consequent grief for the victim(s), if alive, or for those 
                                                 
27  According to one commentator, ‗retributive punishment is designed to restore the status quo ante. It 
advocates hold that ―evil calls and cries for obliteration,‖ and he [the retributivist] will not surrender the hope 
that, in some sense, the wrong can be annulled and set right by some vigorous counteraction of a penal 
character‘. Walter Moberly, ‗Expiation‘, excerpt from his The Ethics of Punishment (1968), in Contemporary 
Punishment, Views, Explanations, and Justifications, eds, by R. J. Gerber and P.D. McAnnay (Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1972), pp. 73–82 (p. 81). Appealing to such injunctions that ‗evil calls and cries for 
obliteration,‘ or ‗evil doing must be stamped out,‘ or there must be ‗zero tolerance of crime‘ do not explain 
what punishment does or is supposed to do about the crime done. 
28 This is why O‘Donovan remarks that ‗The justice manifest in punishment is not exchange-justice, but is 
correctly understood as attributive‘ (p. 113). This, nevertheless, cannot be construed, ipso facto, as a moral 
justification for such attribution. 
29 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 170. The remark is quoted by many supporters of the retributive theory of 
punishment, e.g., it prefaces Rachels‘ paper ‗Punishment and Desert‘. 
30 Feelings tell us other things, of course. Note, however, Nietzsche‘s observation (and admonition) regarding 
the psychological motives behind punishment: ‗But thus do I counsel you, my friends: distrust all in whom the 
impulse to punish is powerful‘. Whatever about the psychological origins whence the feelings of revenge that 
may arise, say, from resentment, for any individual, O‘Donovan is correct to note that ‗[Moral] Intuitions are 
not dismissible, but neither are they self-sufficient; they are open to correlation with each other and with other 
elements of moral experience.‘ (p. 115). And our moral experience has taught us, for example, that ‗informal 
vendettas‘, outside of the law, lead to more and not less social disintegration (ibid., p. 123). Whether resolutions 
once ‗sorted‘ via vendettas is to be de-personalized into institutionalized revenge systems in a given society, 
through, e.g. state capital punishment) by a government is an entirely different matter and a highly debatable 
matter. Other non-punitive responses are possible. O‘Donovan does note that ‗The paradigm case of 
exchange-justice for Thomas is not punishment, but restitution (II-2.62)‘ (p. 112–113, n. 13). Of course, one 
cannot bring a person murdered back to life, but killing the offender is not a necessary response, other 
measures are possible e.g. non-punitive restraint. 
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aggrieved by the crime. This is another way of saying that there is no real connection 
between the crime committed and the punishment meted out afterwards. If punishment, 
therefore, does nothing either for the crime, or for the perpetrator of the crime, or for the 
victim of the crime, then why is punishment necessary?  
 
III 
Defining the Concept of Punishment 
 
In the previous section we noted that metaphors such as ‗balancing the scales of justice‘, 
‗wiping the slate clean‘, ‗paying a debt back to society‘, and ‗removing a cancer for society‘ 
that are used in describing punishment are not helpful at all in the debate about the 
justification of punishment. Far from resolving the problem, they cast obstinate obscurity on 
the issue at hand. Once these metaphors are dispelled from the debate, however, we are still 
left with the question that we raised at the end of the previous section, why the necessity of 
punishment? In order to address this question, we need to figure out what punishment is 
first, without appeal to metaphors but to the concept and the reality of punishment itself, 
and then address the issue of its justification. Again, it is of importance to note that though 
related, these questions of ‗What is punishment?‘ and ‗what justifies punishment?‘, 
nonetheless, are distinct questions. They are also intelligible questions, and intelligible 
questions require some kind of answers. The first question seeks a definition of the concept 
of punishment. The second question addresses the justification of punishment. This section 
deals with the definition of punishment. 
 Drawing on previous attempts (by Kurt Baier, Anthony Flew, and S. F. Benn) to 
define punishment, H.L.A Hart notes that ‗the standard or central case of ―punishment‖‘ 
contains five main components: ‗(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally 
considered unpleasant. (ii) It must be for an offence against legal rules. (iii) It must be of an 
actual or supposed offender for his offence [= the crime]. (iv) It must be intentionally 
administered by human beings other than the offender. (v) It must be imposed and 
administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence is 
committed.‘31 Honderich thinks this definition of punishment can be equally captured in the 
definition of ‗an authority's infliction of a penalty on an offender‘.32 This definition, however, 
is incomplete, as it leaves out an essential ingredient in punishment, namely, ‗for the crime 
(at least allegedly) done‘. To punish, then, is a relational verb, it necessarily involving three 
inter-related components, that is: the punishment ‗x‘ [= whatever format that takes] in 
inflicted on ‗y‘ [= the person] for ‗z‘ [= the crime]. All of these three items are needed in 
order to make any sense or reference to punishment. That we also require an acceptable 
authority to inflict the punishment to complete the definition of punishment is of crucial 
significance too because without an acceptable dispenser of punishment, other things which 
are not, strictly speaking punishment, can go by the name of punishment. Lynch mobs or 
vigilante groups who ‗take punishment into their own hands‘ deviate, both in theory and in 
practice, from the concept of punishment. This is why ‗punishment beatings‘ and 
‗punishment killings‘ that take place outside of the law are called ‗so-called punishment 
beatings‘ and ‗so-called punishment killings‘ precisely because the authority that meted the 
‗punishment‘ is not a legitimate authority. Thus in the State‘s justification of punishment, we 
can define punishment in full as: an acceptable public authority inflicts harm (physical pain, 
                                                 
31 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968; 2008), pp. 4–5. 
32 Honderich, p. 11. 
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loss of freedom, fine, death etc.) on a person for something done, that is, for the crime 
committed that infringes state law. This definition rules out many misuses of the term, such 
as, for instance: ‗the Irish football team were punished 2–0 by Italy in the World Cup Semi-
final for the Irish team manager‘s decision to play three and not four defenders‘; or, ‗the 
rock-star had a head-ache in the morning which was punishment for over-indulgence in 
alcohol the night before‘; or ‗the rabid dog was put in quarantine (solitary confinement) as 
punishment for having a contagious disease‘; or, ‗tax payers are being punished by a levy 
which the government is implementing on pension schemes in order to recoup bad debts 
incurred on account of unscrupulous practices among some bankers‘, or ‗tax payers are been 
punished too for having to pay for those who are kept in prison‘ and so forth. All of these 
are misuses of the term ‗punishment‘. All of these examples play on either reducing or 
focusing on only one the components of punishment mentioned above in Hart‘s definition, 
e.g., unpleasantness. Most medicines, for instance, are unpleasant, but they are not, 
therefore, punishments. And one cannot be punished for nothing.33 In sum, punishment is 
an acceptable public authority‘s infliction of harm on an offender for a crime (at least 
allegedly) done. 
  
 
IV 
Justifying Punishment 
 
Given that we know what punishment is, namely, an acceptable public authority‘s infliction 
of harm (physical pain, loss of freedom, fine, death etc.) on a person for the crime 
committed, what justifies such a practice? Or, perhaps, more simply put, what is punishment 
good for? This is a different question to defining what punishment is, but it is, nonetheless, 
an intelligible question, and it is one that brings us to the question of the morality of 
punishment, its justification. 
 In response to this question, three justifications of punishment, also referred to as 
three ‗theories‘ of punishment, have been put forward, and which we have already briefly 
met in section one of this paper. These justifications are: (1) you deserve punishment for 
breaking the law and committing the crime (the theory of retribution); (2) punishment deters 
future law-breaking (the deterrent theory); (3) punishment reforms the law-breaker (the 
reformative theory). Justifications (2) and (3) are usually referred to as ‗utilitarian 
justifications/ theories‘ since they emphasise the point that part of punishment is the good 
consequences (i.e. deterrence and/ or reform) that punishment can produce for society, i.e., 
punishment encourages law-abiding through threat of pain — and the actual infliction of 
pain, if one does not keep the law — among less than perfectly legally obeying human 
beings. 34  Punishment as a deterrent or as a reformative measure is viewed from this 
perspective, then, as something useful for the ‗smooth functioning‘, as it were, of society. 
The retributive theory, however, offers quite a different conceptual justification for 
punishment. It does not look to the future, but simply and purely to the past, and more 
particularly to the past fact that the crime has been committed. That is to say, the only 
justification for inflicting pain on the offender is the fact that the crime was committed. It is 
                                                 
33 ‗Either you punish someone for something, or you do not punish at all.‘ O‘Donovan, p. 103. 
34 Thus the three theories become two theories of punishment, the ‗utilitarian‘ and the ‗retributivist‘ types. See, 
Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Press, 1997), pp. 91, 
and ff. 
  31 
thus usually characterised as a ‗backward looking‘ theory of punishment. It should not be 
overlooked, nevertheless, that both retributive and the utilitarian justifications of punishment 
are, from conceptual points of view, essentially different kinds of justifications put forward for 
punishment. This has not prevented, alas, some contemporary philosophers from trying to 
combine the best features of both utilitarian and retributive justifications, but such 
compounds rather than solves the problem. 35  And such philosophers cannot but be 
unsuccessful precisely because, as Mabbot clearly noted, deterrence and reform are not part 
of the definition of punishment at all; hence, they cannot feature in the justifications of 
punishment — even if these added goods of deterrence and reform were to be and are to be 
achieved by the punishment, and that, of course, is highly debatable.36 At any rate, deterrence 
and reform is not the raison d’être for punishment. Punishment, by definition, is retribution, 
there is no other way to understand it, but therein resides the main problem. An essential 
part of the meaning of the concept of punishment is that it entails that you are being 
punished because you committed a crime — but this assertion of the definition of 
punishment as retribution cannot be cashed in as a moral justification of punishment.37 If 
punishment is to be justified, it has to be capable of being justified, nevertheless, in terms of 
what it is, that is to say, in terms of retribution. This is the most difficult but the most 
important ethical question in the debate. In Mabbott‘s own paper, it is not clear whether he 
is arguing that (1) retribution is logically bound up with punishment, in that pain deliberately 
inflicted on a person who did not break the law and commit a crime is not, by definition, 
punishment, or that (2) it is morally permissible (or morally obligatory) to punish the guilty. 
Legal justification and moral justification are two separate issues. Mabbott, then, does not 
address this matter in his paper, but falls back in re-asserting the definition of punishment as 
retribution. This enables him to exclude from moral considerations, nevertheless, the 
feasibility of all utilitarian justifications of punishment as the latter justifications are not 
necessarily based upon the meaning of punishment itself, which is retribution. This leaves 
the moral justification of punishment as retribution itself unaddressed, however. It seems to 
me that Mabbott, nevertheless, gives us a hint in his paper about where a possible correct 
                                                 
35  Cf., Hugo Adam Bedau‘s attempt to do this, however, in his article on ‗Punishment‘ (2005), esp. ‗5 
Conclusion‘, in the on-line Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/. O‘Donovan 
likens the debate between the three, irreconcilable and competing theories of punishment as retribution, reform 
and deterrence to ‗a race of hobbled horses. None of the beasts are capable of finishing the course, so the 
victory goes to the jockey who knocks his rivals over‘ (p. 102). Combining features of both type of justification, 
therefore, adds another horse in the race that is not capable of finishing the race. 
36 Other non-punitive measures may have much better effect in deterring law breaking (e.g., video cameras in 
buses to prevent vandalism). Deterrence is a laudable objective of punishment, but whether punishment can 
achieve this is highly dubious. 70% recidivism in Irish prisons would suggest otherwise. The actual extent of 
law-breaking is difficult to assess, nevertheless, because crime reported is a proportion of actual crime taking 
place, and crime going to court is a small proportion of crime reported, and crime convicted in court is a small 
proportion of the crimes prosecuted. Hence reports in ‗rise in crime‘ may mean either (a) rise in reported 
instances of crime, or (b) rise in conviction. Whether one can deduce from this that law-breaking is increasing 
in society is, of course, impossible.  
37 This, I take it, is what Bedau means when he remarks and emphasizes the point: ‗Defining the concept of 
punishment must be kept distinct from justifying punishment. A definition of punishment is, or ought to be, 
value-neutral, at least to the extent of not incorporating any norms or principles that surreptitiously tend to 
justify whatever falls under the definition itself. To put this another way, punishment is not supposed to be 
justified, or even partly justified, by packing its definition in a manner that virtually guarantees that whatever 
counts as punishment is automatically justified. (Conversely, its definition ought not to preclude its 
justification.)‘ (p. 5). If, however, punishment, by definition, is retribution, then its moral justification as 
retribution stands or falls together. 
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answer to this question may lie, in relation to an analogous situation that he recounts that 
arose for him when he was ‗disciplinary officer of a college whose rules included a rule 
compelling attendance at chapel‘.38 Some students broke this rule and he believed that he, 
therefore, had to punish them. It is worth relaying this story. 
 
Many of those who broke this rule broke it on principle. I punished them. I certainly did not 
want to reform them; I respected their characters and their views. I certainly did not want to 
drive others into chapel through fear of penalties. Nor did I think there had been a [moral] 
wrong done which merited [morally] retribution. I wish I could have believed that I would 
have done the same myself. My position was clear. They had broken a rule: they knew it and 
I knew it. Nothing more was necessary to make punishment proper.39 
 
 If we look carefully at the above story we can deduce at least some things of 
relevance to the issue of the moral justification of punishment. Firstly, it is not necessarily 
true to maintain that we treat human beings as (more) responsible agents by punishing 
them.40 There are other ways of treating people who break the law as responsible agents 
without recourse to punitive measures. In fact, Mabbott would have liked to have believed 
that he too would do the same as these students, as a matter of moral principle, and that the 
threat or actual infliction of the penalty would not be the reason for his either obeying or 
disobeying the particular rule.41 In other words, we do not treat human beings as more 
responsible agents by punishing them. Secondly, it is only because the students broke the rule 
that they ‗must‘ or ‗should‘ legally be punished, as Mabbott argues. In other words, the 
students did not, in Mabbott‘s opinion, deserve a harm done to them on moral grounds, but 
on legal grounds only. Mabbot himself, however, says that he, as disciplinary officer, had no 
moral reason to justify the infliction of punitive action on the individuals. If he had no moral 
reasons, then clearly he is not and cannot be justifying the retributive theory of punishment 
from a moral point of view, but implementing, without moral legitimating reasons, the 
practice of punishment. In other words, his proposed defence of the retributive theory of 
punishment in his paper is not a defence, but a re-assertion of the meaning of the concept of 
punishment: you are to be punished, by definition, if you break a rule and commit a crime, 
but this, as his own story as a disciplinary officer indicates, cannot be held as a legitimate moral 
argument for the justification of punishment. 
                                                 
38 Mabbott, p. 155. 
39 Ibid. 
40  Herbert Morris aggress with Moberly that punishment is retribution. See, H. Morris, ‗Persons and 
Punishment‘, The Monist , 52 No. 4 (Oct. 1968) 475–501. He attacks the view that the therapeutic-reform 
approach, as an alternative to punishment, is justifiable because this approach assumes that the person is sick, 
and so, the danger here is to take people and treat them and deny their responsibility. Thus Morris argues that 
by punishing people we are treating them as responsible agents. The question we can raise, however, is: can we 
treat those who break the law as responsible agents without punishing them? 
41 J.R. Lucas makes the interesting argument that the purpose or justification of punishment cannot be taken in 
isolation from the purpose and justification of law, and so, the actual threat of punishment has to be tied to the 
enforcement of the law — keep the law, or else you will be punished. See J.R. Lucas, Responsibility (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), Chapter 6 Punishment, pp. 86–123. This argument, however, can be disputed. First, it 
is difficult to see how the actual infliction of punishment, the validation of the threat of punishment, makes the 
law prevail when one is punished because one has broken the law. Even if the threat of punishment prevents 
most people from breaking the law, and this serves some sort of reformatory (or deterrent) function on people 
to obey and keep the law, one can still ask is this a morally justifiable position to adopt in regulating human 
conduct.  
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V 
Conclusion 
 
Punishment is often talked about in (misleading) metaphors and defended by recourse to 
qualitatively different and mutually exclusive retributivist or utilitarian-consequentialist moral 
justifications, and even features of both of these justifications held by the same person as 
essential to its justification. This, however, should not deflect one‘s attention from the fact 
that stripped of metaphors, such as, ‗balancing the scales of justice‘, ‗wiping the slate clean‘ 
or ‗paying a debt back to society‘, punishment is revenge, and that retributivist and 
utilitarian-consequentialist justifications of punishment as an institutionalized revenge system 
are incompatible justifications of that institution. The pertinent moral question regarding 
punishment, therefore, would appear to be whether revenge is morally justifiable, or not. 
Addressing this matter would take much more time and detailed treatment than at hand for 
me at the moment, but it is suffice to say that when social order breaks down and revenge is 
the measured response to that break down in social order, the order is not restored through 
acts of revenge but further disintegration of the order happens.42 This is well illustrated in 
the films on the Mafia and in ‗real life‘ ‗turf wars‘ among organised criminals e.g., ‗drug 
barons‘ and their ‗competing groups‘ — their forms of ‗justice‘ leads to more and not less 
death and destruction in its wake. Whether the deliberate infliction of harm on the 
perpetrator of a crime for the initial harm done through punishment that is legitimated 
through the institution of retributive-punishment practice of the State fares any better from 
a moral point of view at least questionable and debatable. 43  So, does the utilitarian 
justification for State punishment fair better? Reform and deterrence are laudable objectives, 
but can the State achieve these through punishment? Punishment steps in after the law has 
been broken, and so, from this point of view, punishment cannot be justified in 
‗maintaining‘ or ‗supporting‘ law and order. Punishment, as a reformative measure, is highly 
suspect too. Infliction of harm could lead to deeper resentment. Harsher sentencing could 
lead to more intelligent criminal behaviour on others to avoid detection. Non-punitive 
measures of reform and rehabilitation are better suited to achieve the objectives of reform 
and rehabilitation which the State seeks.  
 If punishment, therefore, can do nothing for the crime that had been done, and 
cannot do anything for the perpetrator of the crime, or anything for the victim of the crime, 
is it still a valuable social institution? If punishment is not capable of doing what it claims it 
can do in relation to the crime, and if it does not effectively reform or deter the criminal, or 
exact retribution, then what can we put in its place? This question concerns the phasing-out 
of the punitive dimension of punishment, and the putting in its place alternative responses, 
but this takes us beyond the question of the justification of punishment and requires 
thinking differently about more appropriate ways of responding to crime committed and to 
                                                 
42 It is often argued that punishment by the State is not personal, and hence cannot be understood, correctly, as 
personal vengeance; however, see surpa n. 12. 
43 ‗We are all mortal, and our life has a limited expectancy. That fact gives all crime and punishment its 
meaning. Two years in prison are ―two good years of my life‖; if we were immortal, they would could for 
nothing. A heavy fine is a drain on resources needed for food, clothing, and shelter. Corporal punishment 
weakens the bodily constitution. Every serious crime is an assault, directly or indirectly, on the victim‘s life; so 
every punishment, too, is an assault on the offender‘s life.‘ O‘Donovan, p. 122. We can still ask, what is the 
latter, the assault, i.e., punishment, good for? What justifies this? 
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those who break the law.44 This means, however, that a certain amount of crime will have to 
be tolerated, but non-punitive remedies that are focused on recompense, restitution, 
rehabilitation, reform and restraint are all measures designed to make things better. It is hard, 
however, to get people to think non-punitively because, like revenge, the desire for 
punishment is a natural reaction. There is, nevertheless, growing dissatisfaction with the 
effectiveness punishment as a social institution. Recent choices, for instance, offered to drug 
addicts who are found guilty of stealing to feed their habit, to go to jail or to attend 
rehabilitation clinics, point against the argument for the necessity and effectiveness, and so, 
value of punitive systems. Punishment steps in after the crime has taken place; it bolts the 
door when the horse has fled. That punishment by the State, therefore, does something about 
the crime committed in the State and that the State through punishment is addressing crime 
would appear to be a noble lie of the State. Part of the way society is, nevertheless, is the way 
we want it to be. If we wanted to address crime differently through non-punitive practises that 
would change the way society works and social existence develops. Punishment is, 
nevertheless, a fact of society but it is worth noting in closing that only a very select few 
people receive punishment for crimes actually committed. Of actual crime taking place, a lot 
of crime goes undetected and a lot of crime detected is not reported. A certain amount of 
reported crime is not (and cannot) be seriously investigated. Much crime investigated does 
not lead to detection. Much of such detection of crime does not lead to prosecution (e.g., 
insufficient evidence). A lot of crimes prosecuted in courts do not lead to conviction (e.g., 
reasonable doubt has to be respected). A lot of crimes convicted in court do not lead to 
punishment (e.g., ‗probation act‘, appeals court, squashed convictions on technicalities).45 
Only a very select few of those who break the law are punished by the State for the actual 
crime taking place in society. If justice, therefore, is so selective, is this justice at all? Or, is 
this not part of the scapegoat phenomenon?  
 
 
 
                                                 
44 This would apply, therefore, in analogous situations of punishment too, such as, e.g. by schools, parents, 
employers, clubs etc. 
45 Increase/ decrease in crime reported or in crime convicted, therefore, do not imply increase/ decrease in 
actual crimes being committed in a given society. It is thus difficult to assess the extent of actual law-breaking 
in society and on whether crime is on the increase or decrease by focusing on increase/ decrease of statistics 
relating to crime reported or to crime punished. See, supra, n. 36.  
  
 
